| 外部竞争对供应链内部需求信息共享机制的影响 |
| The impact of external competition on the demand information sharing mechanism within a supply chain |
| 摘要点击 6 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2024-11-03 修订日期：2025-07-17 |
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| 中文关键词 供应链管理；需求不确定；公开的批发价格；信息共享；信号博弈 |
| 英文关键词 Supply chain management; Demand uncertainty; Public wholesale price; Information sharing; Signal game |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目，重点项目，重大项目） |
| 投稿方向 |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 李斧头 | 南开大学商学院 | 300071 | | 王玮* | 南开大学商学院 | 300071 | | 李勇建 | 南开大学商学院 | |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 针对一个由单个制造商和单个拥有信息的零售商组成的长期经营的在位供应链，同时考虑一个新进入市场的企业与零售商在同一市场竞争，通过构建博弈模型来分析在公开的批发价格情形下，零售商的信息共享策略对供应链成员绩效的影响，研究结果表明：对于零售商而言，是否选择共享需求信息，由竞争强度和市场的不确定性水平共同决定。对于制造商而言，直觉上应该偏好共享信息；有趣的是，在一些情形下不共享信息反而对其更有利。对于新进企业而言，不必过分担心在位供应链企业之间信息透明化；相反，在一些区域内在位者之间信息透明可能会提升新进企业的收益。 |
| 英文摘要 |
| In view of a long-term supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer with access to demand information, and considering the entry of a new enterprise competing in the same market, this paper constructs a game model to analyze the impact of the retailer’s information-sharing strategy on the performance of supply chain members under public wholesale pricing. The findings suggest that whether the retailer chooses to share demand information depends on the intensity of competition and the level of market uncertainty. For the manufacturer, there is typically an intuitive preference for information sharing; however, in certain cases, withholding information may be more beneficial. For the new entrant, excessive concern about information transparency among existing supply chain firms is unnecessary. In fact, in some cases, transparency among incumbents may enhance the profit of the new entrant. |
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